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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY
KAY, ROBERT L. KAY,
and TERESA KAY,

:
:

PlaintiffsAppellants,

:

Case No. 870121

:

Category 14b

vs.
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC.,
a corporation, VAL E.
SOUTHWICK; et al. ,

:

DefendantsRespondents.

:

\FIPH | AN |«s UH'I \ BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Contrary to the statement on page 1 of respondents' brief,
appellants

(Kays) appealed

from

all portions

of the Ruling

granting Defendants1 Motion fur Summary Judgment A\W.I dismissing
Kays1 complaint

Although certain portions of that ruling were

not addressed in appellants'
those portions turns on t
were

specifically

addressed.

nitial brief, the correctness of
t" s ruling on the portions which
Appellants

are entitled

to a

reversal for trial on the merits on all issues.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellants object to respondents' (defendants1) assertion,
set forth in paragraph

I of respondent's statement of Issues

Presented, that appellants have "misinterpreted" testimony not
previously presented to the trial court.

Respondents do not

identify any specific testimony which they claim was misinterpreted.

Appellants readily acknowledge that their interpreta-

tion of the testimony may be different from that of respondents.
On a motion for summary judgment, however, it is very proper for
appellants to draw all inferences from the testimony
light most favorable to their position.

in the

Bowen v. Riverton City,

656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants object to the statements set forth in the first
two

paragraphs

of

the

"Statement

of

the

Case"

section

of

respondents1 brief, to the effect that appellants1 problems are
due solely to an economic decline in Vernal, Utah.

Respondents

cite to no evidence in support of their assertions, and none was
presented to the trial court.

More importantly, the evidence

does establish that in spite of any economic decline which may
have existed, the Kays obtained a valid offer for the purchase
of the entire subdivision.
which prevented
economy

but

reconveyance

(R. 504, 529.)

Kays from accepting that offer was not the

rather respondents1
of

The only factor

lots

in

failure to

accordance

with

arrange
their

for the

contractual

obligations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kays object to the assertion, in the first paragraph of
the Statement of Facts section of respondents1 brief (page 6),
to the effect that only the facts set forth by defendants were
"established"

before

the

lower
2

court.

Facts

are

not

"established"
tional
193

on

a

for

s e n s e of: the w o r d ,

(Utah 1 9 7 5 ) •

statements

283

"facts"

record

opposing

(Utah A p p .

reasoixafal e

judgment

in

H o l b r o o k C o , v. A d a m s ,

are

are

i eweel ;i n the

the motion.

1987).

I nferences

which

summary

the

tradi-

542 P.2d

191,

Both in t h e trial c o u r t a n d in .this court,

in the

to the party
281,

motion

light

those

"established"

favorable

Brigcrs v . H o l c o m b ,

Those statements,

from

most

for

740

P.2d

together with

statements,
purposes

constitute
of

the

summary

all
the

judg-

ment .
Contrary
have

cited

therefrom

I.

to

this

which

that the record
shown below
cited

by

addition,
by

the

t h e s e well

PS< abwished

cour*

facts

favopn

are

~

^^

in t h e A r g u m e n t

defendants
defendants

record.

die

which

several

Finally,

*

:*:**?

laim

follows,

several

ur

disputed.

were

facts which

defendants

inferences

f a c t s or i n f e r e n c e s

inaccurate

omit

defendants

* tie

and

^ it

is d e v o i d of a n y o t h e r

and

principles,

draw

were

As

"facts"
In

established

inferences

from

fact s o n .1 y i n t: h e I r I a v o r
Defendants
Statement
banks

of

prior;

("Summit").
however,

correctly

Facts
to
The

further

that' K a y s

seeking
record

assert

in

had

applied

financing
cited

suppo r t s

i he

to

paragraph

from
the

for

i n f erence

of

their

ft" DIT«

three

Systems,

Inc.

loins

Summit
tria 1

2

court

tl: la t

tne

by

Summit,

decision

t h e s e b a n k s t o n o t e x t e n d f i n a n c i n g w a s not r e l a t e d t o any
inherent
made

in the t r a n s a c t i o n ,

affirmative

statements

and t h a t s o m e of t h e b a n k
n i tu the

3

'/lability of t h e

risks

officers
project.

of

The banks simply did not want to commit that amount of money to
the Vernal area.

(R. 431-32.)

In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts section of their
brief, defendants assert that Summit paid certain closing and
other costs beyond what would be expected for a "typical" loan
transaction.
trial

Although defendants made this assertion before the

court, Kays

specifically

disputed

the

assertion,

and

pointed out that the $139,000.00 discount was more than adequate
to cover the costs of these expenses paid by Summit.

(R. 510.)

Defendants failed to include in their Statement of Facts,
and incorrectly assert that the record did not establish, the
fact as set forth in Kays' initial brief that Kays had been
advised and had understood up until the time of closing that the
discount would be approximately 10% and the interest rate would
be 10%.

(R. 499, 524.)

They did not learn until closing that

the discount would be approximately 17% and the interest rate
would be 17%.

(R. 500, 525.)

Although Kays objected to the

discount rate and interest rate, they had no reasonable alternative at that time but to sign the loan documents.

(Deposition

of Lawrence Kay, June 12, 1986, at pages 93-94.)
The

record

also

"establishes"

that

at

closing

Val

Southwick, president of Summit, advised and assured plaintiffs
that the appropriate number of lots would be reconveyed upon the
calling

of

the

letters

payments of principal.

of

credit, the

same

(R. 500-01, 525-26.)

4

as with

other

In paragraph

12 of their Statement of Facts, defendants

refer to :t second written request :;or; release of lots.

Defen-

dants' Statement of Facts fails tr acknowledge, and incorrectly
asserts that the record did not s^r^b,ish ; that pla i ntiffs made
a written request
1985,

'-

additional

for the release of

503-04, 528-29.)
pr^:.

Lots on January 10,

In addition, plaintiffs made an

~ - - - •-

1, 1985, in response -•

12

-

-;-isf

' *ne lots about May

*/:,.-; Summit promised to reconvey the

The June 2, 1985, letter was merely * memorialization of

lots.

those prior d I scussions and agr eemei its

H

-•.- *

«. -

Although the issue is not material, the record
that
1986,

the Complaint
not

on

in this matter was

March

?'?,

1 986,

as

filed

asserted

indicates

on February
by

defendants

12,
in

paragraph 19 of their Statement of Facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants assert that plaintiffs can not on appeal rely
on

evidence

attention

issue

which

«,»f" flip

because

was
tri.il

the

in the

record

imdqe,

This

evidence

which

but

not

i our t

was

~:

brought
•

called

fact precluding

that

issue, Rule

clearly
disputed

provides

summary
56(c)
that

judgmen-

- le

issues of material

judgment

course can not

:

is

facts appear

affidavits, and other materials on file.

trial
issues

"f the Cnnrf d^es reach

of the Utah Rules
summary

uAe

•-,. . - b a t

court's attention establishes the existence ui material
ot

*

:ivii

prec:udp.

Procedure
if

any

in the depositionr y

Although plaintiffs of

introduce new evidence mi appeal, they iiidy rely

5

on any statements in any of the depositions, affidavits, or
other materials which were on file with the trial court, even if
the existence of those statements was not specifically called to
the trial court's attention.
Summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction issue was
improper in any event because there exist disputed issues of
material facts, even if the inquiry is limited solely to those
portions of the record called to the attention of the trial
court.
The contract between the parties required defendants to
reconvey

an

appropriate

number

of

lots

upon

receiving

payment of principal, including payments resulting
calling

of letters of credit.

unreasonable
proposed

as

contended

construction

reasonable.

from the

Such a construction

by

defendants,

of the contract would

any

is not

and

defendants1

be

equally un-

To the extent the contract was ambiguous, there

existed a genuine issue of material fact as to what the parties
intended by the contract.
The assertion that plaintiffs accepted the benefits of the
contract and thereby waived any claim to seek reformation of the
contract is raised for the first time on appeal, and should not
be considered by this court.

Similarly raised for the first

time on appeal is the assertion that plaintiffs1

claims for

reformation are barred by Summit's assignment of the ben^icial
interest under the trust deed to various allegedly bona fide
purchasers.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED IF ISSUES OF FACT
APPEAR IN ANY MATERIALS ON FILE, NOT JUST IN THE
MATERIALS CIl^D TO THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendants assert on page 13 of their brief that "[i]n their
appellate brief, the Kays rely heavily upon deposition testimony
of the Kays and others which was never presented to the lower
court."

Defendants assert that this is improper.1

need not reach this issue.

This Court

Kays acknowledge that they have

cited to this Court certain deposition testimony which was not
specifically called to the attention of the trial court prior to
the ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

This "extra"

deposition testimony, however, merely highlights the existence
of disputed issues of fact.

Those disputed factual issues are

also apparent from the affidavits and depositions which were
cited to the trial court prior to its ruling.

See Point III

below.
Appellants may, nevertheless, rely on appeal on statements
in the record which were not specifically called to the attention of the trial court.

The test of whether summary judgment

is appropriate is whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

defendants advisedly do not challenge the fact that the
^^atements in the depositions clearly raise factual disputes.
Defendants apparently concede that the summary judgment must be
reversed if the deposition testimony is considered, and seek to
avoid that result solely by objecting to the consideration of
that testimony.
7

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
added).

Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (~)

(emphasis

This Court should apply the same standard on review.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).

See also

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah
1987).
The critical inquiry, therefore, both at the trial level
and before this court, is whether the depositions and other
materials on file evidence disputed issues of material facts.
See Conder v. A. L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634,
641 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring).

If the depositions

on file establish the existence of a disputed issue of material
fact, a grant of summary judgment must be reversed, even if that
portion of the deposition was not specifically called to the
attention of the trial court.
In so asserting, appellants acknowledge that it would have
been preferable to have called the trial court's attention to
the portions of the deposition which establish the existence of
disputed

factual

issues.2

Appellants1

2

failure

does

not,

Appellants, through their present counsel, did call the
portions of the deposition testimony to the attention of the
trial court after the grant of summary judgment, and requested
the court to vacate the judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ P.
60(b).
(R. 977-79.)
Because Judge Davidson, who granted the
summary judgment, had bee^ appointed to the Court of Appeals,
plaintiff's motion for an order vacating the grant of summary
judgment was heard by Judge Boyd Bunnell. Judge Bunnell denied
the motion on the grounds that it was in the nature of an
appeal. (R. 1097-1100.) But see 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 184
(1971) (successor judge has full authority to hear and determine
8

however, abrogate the clear directive of Rule 56(c) that the
propriety of summary judgment is governed by all material on
file.

Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Corp,,

722 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1983).

The principle was explained

by one federal court as follows:
It is bootless to contend, as defendants
did on oral argument, that, although the
deposition was filed in the record, it
could properly be ignored by the judge
in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment because plaintiff's counsel did
not in some manner bring it directly to
the judge's attention.
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c) provides in part:
The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers to interrogatories,
and
admissions
on file,
together
with
the
affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and
that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
The rule does not distinguish between
depositions merely
filed and those
singled out by counsel for special
attention.
Higgenbotham v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 607 F. 2d 653, 656
(5th Cir. 1979) .
Furthermore, regardless of whether it was called to the
attention of the trial court, the deposition testimony which
undisputedly establishes the existence of a material

factual

issue has now been cited both to the trial court and to this
motion for a new trial).

9

court*

It

would

exalt

form

over

substance,

and

unfairly

penalize the Kays for the conduct of their counsel, to ignore
those facts:
Having read [the record], we cannot
ignore what we have found.
"Appellate
courts should not look the other way to
ignore the existence of genuine issues
of material facts . . . .,f
Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Construction Co.,
Inc., 695 F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir 1983), quoting Mintz v. Mathers
Fund, Inc., 463 I.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir 1972).
Defendants rely primarily on two Utah cases in support of
their assertion that appellants may not now rely on deposition
testimony not cited to the trial court.

Cowan & Co. v. Atlas

Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984); Franklin
Financial v. New Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45
(Utah

1983).

Neither

of

these

presented in the instant case.

cases

addresses

the

issue

The issue in each case was

whether the appellant could rely on appeal on evidence which was
not part of the record before the trial court.

In the instant

case, the deposition testimony upon which appellants rely was
clearly part of the record.
In summary, Rule 56(c) clearly prohibits summary judgment
if evidence of a disputed issue of fact exists in the depositions and other materials on file.

The deposition testimony

relied upon by appellants in their initial brief was all

lf

on

file" with the district court prior to the grant of summary
judgment.

Defendants

advisedly
10

do

not

dispute

that

those

depositions
factual

establish

issue

satisfaction.

the

relating
Summary

existence

to

the

of

a

existence

disputed
of

judgment was improper,

an

material

accord

and

and this case

should be remanded for a trial on the merits.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO
TIMELY RECONVEY LOTS.
Point I of appellants1

initial brief3 established that

defendants had breached the trust deed and trust deed note by
failing to reconvey twelve lots pursuant to a written demand
made on January 10, 1985.

Kays were entitled to the recon-

veyance of those lots by reason of principal payments resulting
from the calling of letters of credit.

Defendants respond to

this argument by asserting that requiring defendants to reconvey
the lots would have resulted in an impairment of their security,
and argue that such a construction is contrary to what defendants

view

as

the

intent

and

purpose

of

the

trust

deed.

Defendants then set forth a hypothetical example on pages 25 and
26 of their brief which they claim illustrates their point.
Defendants' argument might have some merit if Kays had
agreed, as incorrectly asserted by defendants on page 22 of
their brief, to "fully collateralize" the loan, and if the sole
purpose of the trust deed was to protect the defendants.

Kays

made

also

no

such

agreement,

however,

3

and

the

trust

deed

Defendants incorrectly refer to this issue in their brief
as the Kays1 "second" major contention, and refer to the fourth
and final point in Kays1 initial brief as Kays1 primary argument.

11

contained provisions for the benefit of Kays.

Just as the

construction of the trust deed urged by Kays might seem to
conflict with the purpose perceived by defendants of providing
security for the loan, so the construction advocated by defendants conflicts with the purpose of allowing reconveyances of
lots which could then be sold to generate the money necessary to
make further payments.

The hypothetical example4 postulated by

defendants illustrates this point:
Borrower desires to develop 50
lots into an improved subdivision, and
borrows $100,000.00 to do so. Security
for the loan is 50 lots valued at
$1,000.00 each, and two letters of
credit, one for $30,000.00 and one for
$20,000.00.
Lender agrees to release
one lot for each $2,000.00 principal
received.
Borrower fails to make the first
payment due on the loan, so the lender
draws on the $30,000.00 letter of
credit, but does not reconvey any lots.
Because borrower has no lots which can
be resold, he is not able to make the
next payment and the lender draws on the
$20,000.00 letter of credit, again
refusing to reconvey any lots.
4

The hypothetical postulated by defendants does not, of
course, conform to the facts in this case. First, the letters
of credit in fact comprised only 35% of the total security even
using defendants' assumptions as to the value of that security.
(The evidence would also support a finding that the letters of
credit were a much smaller proportion of the entire security,
i.e., that the real estate was worth much more than $526,000.00.
(Deposition of Lawrence Kay, June 12, 1986, at Exhibit 9.))
More importantly, the trust deed provided that on: lot
would be reconveyed for each $15,000.00 principal paid. There
is no evidence which would justify this Court in assuming that
the lots were valued at less than $15,000.00 each, and certainly
no basis to assume they were only worth $7,500.00 each as
implicitly assumed by the hypothetical.
12

Lender is now owed $50,000.00,
secured by $50,000.00 in lots, and
perceives the transaction as being fair.
The
borrower,
however,
has
"paid"
$50,000.00 b ~ has no lots to market.
If the borrower is somehow able to
pay the remaining $50,000.00, borrower
would be entitled to a reconveyance of
25 lots. Just before the final payment
is made, the lender will be owed only
$2,000.00, but will hold 26 lots, valued
at $26,000.00, as security.
This hypothetical, viewed

from the perspective

borrower, demonstrates the commercial

impracticability

construction of the contract urged by defendants.

of the
of the

It does not

make commercial sense from the borrower's viewpoint to be unable
to obtain reconveyances of lots where the borrower has already
paid several times the value of those lots.
Although each construction of the trust deed is reasonable
when viewed from the perspective of the party advocating that
construction,

neither

construction

is

wholly

satisfactory.

Under such circumstances, two rules of law dictate the result.
First, the contract is to be construed against the drafter,
Summit Systems, Inc., and in particular, release provisions in a
trust deed

"should be interpreted more strongly against the

party required to give the release . . . . M

Sears v. Riemersma.

655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted).

Second, to

the extent that the contract is ambiguous, summary judgment was
improper because there existed issues of fact as to what the
parties intended by the agreement.
testified by affidavit as follows:
13

Both Robert and Lawrence Kay

On the occasion of the First
Meeting and on the occasion of the Loan
Closing, Southwick advised plaintiffs
that in the event that it became
necessary for Summit to resort to the
letters of credit which were given by
plaintiffs to Summit as additional
security for the Subject Loan, any
portion of the proceeds therefrom which
was applied toward the reduction of the
principal amount of the Subject Loan
would entitle plaintiffs to a release of
lots as otherwise provided in the
documents evidencing the subject loan.
R. 500-01, 525-26.
Where a contract is ambiguous, the construction of the
contract is a question of fact.

Craig Food Industries, Inc. v.

Weihina, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1987) .

Summary

judgment on this issue was improper.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
NEGATED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Defendants assert in their brief that Kays may not on
appeal rely on any statements in the record which were not
specifically called to the attention of the trial court.
I

of this Reply

Brief

establishes

that this

Point

contention

contrary to the clear language of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

is
The

court does not need to reach that issue, however, because the
evidence which was called to the attention of the trial court
negates the existence of an accord and satisfaction.
forth more fully on pages ?~ and 18 of Kays1

As set

initial brief,

Lawrence Kay and Robert Kay each testified with respect to the
release of lots as follows:
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Southwick denied Summit had any obligation to provide plaintiffs with releases
of lots until approximately May 1, 1985,
but
he
thereafter
repeatedly
acknowledged Summit's obligation to provide
plaintiffs
with
such
releases
and
repeatedly promised Affiant that Summit
would promptly provide such releases.
Affidavit of Lawrence C. Kay, paragraph 17

(R. 503-04); Af-

fidavit of Robert L. Kay, paragraph 17 (R. 528-29).
A

reasonable

inference

from

these

statements

is that

Summit determined to reconvey the seven lots not to compromise
and settle a greater claim, but because Summ:.t had

finally

acknowledged that Kays were entitled to the release of those
lots and had agreed to perform its legal obligation.
In contrast

to this evidence, defendants presented

no

evidence in support of their claim of accord and satisfaction,
and certainly did not present any evidence clearly demonstrating
that there was a definite meeting of the minds and that the
parties understood that Kays, by accepting the seven lots, were
waiving their claim to the greater number of lots.

See Security

State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1987); Tates
Inc. v. Little America Refining Co. , 535 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah
1975).
Even based upon the evidence which was specifically called
to the attention of the trial court, therefore, when properly
viewed in the light most favorable to Kays, summary judgment on
the issue of accord and satisfaction was improper.
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POINT IV
THE CLAIM THAT KAYS ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS OF
LOAN AND RATIFIED IT AND ACCORDINGLY CAN NOT
REFORM THE CONTRACT WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
Point

IV.C.

of

respondents1

brief

asserts

that

Kays

accepted the benefits of the loan and ratified it and accordingly are barred from seeking reformation of the contract.

This

claim is raised for the first time on appeal, and should not be
considered by this court.

James v. Preston. 71 Utah Adv. Rep.

49, 50 (Ct. App. 1937).
POINT V
THE CLAIM THAT THE TRUST DEED AND THE NOTE CAN NOT
BE REFORMED BECAUSE THEY ARE HELD BY BONA FIDE
PURCHASERS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Point IV.D. of respondent's brief asserts that the trust
deed and note were assigned to bona fide purchasers, and that
the assignment bars reformation.

No evidence was presented to

the trial court as to whether the assignees of the trust deed
and note took their assignments in good faith and without notice
of any potential claims relating to the note.

In addition, the

claim is raised for the first time on appeal.

Although there is

an oblique reference to the issue in Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 559), it does
not appear that the issue was actually considered by the trial
court and it can not be considered to have been raised before
that court.

Defendants are therefore barred from raising that

16

issue on appeal.

James v. Preston, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50

(Ct. App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
The evidence called to the attention of the trial court,
viewed as required in the light most favorable to Kays, raises a
disputed factual issue as to whether Kays understood that by
accepting

the

reconveyance

of

seven

lots they were

thereby

waiving their claim for a reconveyance of a greater number of
lots.

Summary judgment on that issue was therefore improper,

even based on the limited evidence specifically called to the
attention of the trial court.
Kays in addition called to the attention of the trial
court in a post judgment motion, and have demonstrated to this
court on appeal, that statements in depositions which were on
file with the district court undisputedly raise an issue of fact
with respect to the claim of accord and satisfaction.

Respon-

dents apparently concede that the statements in the deposition
raise an issue of fact, but seek to have this court ignore those
statements because they were not specifically
attention of the trial court.

called to the

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, however, clearly provides that summary judgment
is precluded if a dispute of fact appears in the depositions on
file.

Furthermore, this Court, having been now apprised of the

existence of the issue of fact, should not ignore what now
clearly appears.
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Summit breached the terms of the trust deed and note by
failing to reconvey lots to which Kays were entitled.

Two

constructions of the trust deed are possible, and each construction is reasonable when viewed from the perspective of the party
advocating that construction.

The trust deed must accordingly

be construed against Summit, who drafted it, or in the alternative, this court should hold that the contract is ambiguous and
remand for the taking of evidence as to the intention of the
parties.
The judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiffs'
Complaint on Summary Judgment should be reversed, and this case
remanded for trial on the merits on all issues.
DATED this 4th day of January, 1988.
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